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My enemy’s enemy – Turkey’s stance on Islamic State
Mateusz Chudziak
In the context of the civil war in Syria, Turkey has been accused of intense co-operation with 
Islamic State. The accusations have been coming for some time from the West, and also from 
the Turkish opposition and the Kurds. The Russian government has also joined in the accu-
sations over the past few months. According to the Kremlin’s narrative, Turkey allegedly not 
only supports this organisation but is also engaged in trading oil with it ‘on an industrial 
scale’. Ankara, which has categorically denied these reports, has undoubtedly displayed great 
ambivalence in its attitude towards Islamic State. Accusations of systemic co-operation with 
radical militants in Syria and Iraq are difficult to confirm. The radicals themselves pose a seri-
ous threat to Turkey’s security. The terrorist attacks in Turkey are suspected to have seriously 
affected its internal stability and international reputation of being a safe country (especially 
the Istanbul attack on 12 January 2016). The internal characteristics of the Syrian conflict 
and the engagement of external forces make it difficult to verify the reports on extensive 
and coordinated co-operation between Ankara and Islamic State. All parties to this conflict 
receive external support, and the situation in Syria itself is changing. However, this does not 
change the fact that Turkey has for a long time tactically benefited from the existence and 
operation of Islamic State, given that its priorities include ending Bashar al-Assad’s regime 
and preventing a Kurdish autonomous region being established in Syria. Yet, its ambivalent 
stance on the ‘enemy of its enemy’ poses a serious risk to both Turkey’s internal stability and 
its international reputation. 
Accusations of co-operation 
with Islamic State
Turkey was accused of co-operation with Islamic 
State already before Russia became engaged 
in the conflict. Accusations of this kind have 
been heard from Syrian Kurds, Western com-
mentators, the Turkish opposition, and – since 
the deterioration of Turkish-Russian relations – 
also from Russian and Iranian leaders. 
Turkey has been blamed for arming radical Is-
lamic militants1 – convoys with arms, ammuni-
tion and supplies reportedly en route to militants 
1 Semih Idiz, Is Turkey arming radical groups in Syria?, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/tur-
key-syria-aiming-radical-groups-shipping-weapons.html
have been sent to Syria, and their delivery was 
reported to have been coordinated by Turkish 
intelligence. State officials and journalists who 
revealed that the convoys had been sent to rad-
ical fighters were arrested on charges of sup-
porting the so-called ‘parallel state’, a movement 
accused of attempting to overthrow the gov-
ernment2. The government has responded to 
2 The term ‘parallel state’ (not to be confused with the 
‘deep state’) is used in Turkey to refer to the movement 
led by supporters of Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim preach-
er and businessman, who once backed the government. 
The movement used to have strong influence inside the 
various state institutions (including the police, the gen-
darmerie and the judiciary). Since the corruption scandal 
in December 2013, the government has taken on this 
movement, and the media outlets controlled by it have 
been taken over by the state.
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the accusations that the support was intended 
to be provided to Syrian Turkmens3. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that Turkish border 
services turned a blind eye to jihadists crossing 
the Turkish-Syrian border. According to Kurdish 
sources, traffic on the border was moving both 
ways, and not only were the fighters not obstruct-
ed by Turkish border guards, they also received, 
for example, Turkish uniforms from them4. 
According to the Turkish press, Duzce and Ada-
pazari in western Turkey, where supporters of 
Islamic State gather, have also become training 
centres supervised by units of Turkish Islamic rad-
icals. In turn, Turkish state services were report-
edly aware of their operation and disregarded 
this fact5. 
The list of accusations also includes tolerating 
the presence of jihadists in Turkey itself and 
their campaigning activity in many Turkish 
cities. Radical fighters also reportedly came 
from Syria to Turkey to receive medical aid 
at hospitals or to rest. Furthermore, members 
of the governing party, AKP, have been accused 
of expressing their approval in public for the 
operation of Islamic State, displaying solidarity 
with fighters of this para-state and even hold-
ing meetings with Islamic radicals in Germany 
and convincing them to join the ranks of IS6.
3 Semih Idiz, Is Turkey…, op. cit.
4 For the list of accusations addressed to the Turkish 
state in Western and Turkish media see: David L. Philips, 
Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey List, http://www.huff-
ingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-
turke_b_6128950.html
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Even before the Russian Su-24 aircraft was shot 
down by Turkey on 24 November 2015, Vladimir 
Putin joined the accusations formulated in 
the West and Turkey. In mid-November, dur-
ing the G20 summit in Antalya, Turkey, he sug-
gested that Turkey was involved in the trade of 
oil with Islamic State. These accusations have 
gained strength since the incident and have 
been repeated on numerous occasions in the 
Western media. 
At home in Turkey the strongest accusations 
of this co-operation have been heard from the 
head of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), 
Selahattin Demirtas. He said after the Ankara 
bombing that this attack would not have been 
possible without approval from the Turkish 
state services7. These accusations have been 
proven right by leaks from the Presidential Pal-
ace revealed by the press, according to which 
Turkish intelligence infiltrates jihadists with the 
intention of using this organisation also for 
achieving short-term goals in domestic policy8.
Since 2013, Turkey has branded Islamic State 
a terrorist organisation. Although Turkey is 
formally a member of the Western coalition 
combating jihadists in Syria, it only began to 
take part in more decisive moves in July 2015. 
At the same time, it became focused in com-
bating Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq, and 
its attacks on jihadist targets turned out to be 
only symbolic9.
The aforementioned accusations are difficult to 
verify, and in many cases they are based solely 
7 Turkish opposition blames govt. ‘blind eye’ for attack, 
http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/10/12/tur-
key-intv-amanpour-pleitgen-selahattin-demirtas.cnn
8 Ne olur bu kez yanıl Fuat Avni..Katliam sonrası korkunç id-
dialar….’Erdoğan, http://www.taraf.com.tr/fuat-avnid-
en-katliam-sonrasi-korkunc-iddialar-erdogan-ic-sa-
vas-cikaracak-rus-jeti-dusurecek-o-valiyi-alacak/
9 An anonymous Islamic State militant in his correspond-
ence with Cumhuriyet newspaper claimed that the Turk-
ish air force dropped bombs on buildings that had been 
abandoned by jihadists. See IŞİD yöneticisi konuştu... 
“TSK’nın vurdukları eski karargâhlarımız”, http://www.
cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/331729/ISiD_yonetici-
si_konustu...__TSK_nin_vurduklari_eski_kararg_hlarim-
iz_.html
Turkey has been blamed for arming rad-
ical Islamic militants – convoys with 
arms, ammunition and supplies report-
edly en route to militants have been sent 
to Syria.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 198
on circumstantial evidence10. However, the 
number of examples alone illustrating Anka-
ra’s support for Islamic State is overwhelming. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish government has as yet 
been unable to develop an alternative narrative 
that would demonstrate both the complexity of 
the conflict and the involvement of the other 
players in it, who may support the grouping or 
derive political benefits from its operation to 
a similar extent. In this way the image of Turkey 
as an informal protector, and thus an unreliable 
partner for Western states engaged in the con-
flict, is being reinforced. 
The Syrian ‘cauldron’
The internal characteristics of the conflict in 
Syria make it very difficult to unanimously 
determine Turkey’s real engagement and to 
interpret media reports on Ankara’s support 
for Islamic State. The anti-government oppo-
sition in Syria is non-homogeneous, consisting 
of radical Islamic groupings and the Free Syr-
ian Army. Fighters were often exchanged be-
tween these organisations at the time of mil-
itary operations. The opposition forces also 
combat Islamic State and the Syrian Kurds. 
In turn, the latter fight jihadists and are neu-
tral towards Assad’s forces. Meanwhile, the 
political emancipation of the Syrian Kurds, who 
10 The Turkish army in co-operation with US officers 
trained soldiers of the Free Syrian Army. It cannot be 
ruled out that part of their trainees changed sides dur-
ing the fights to join IS, taking with themselves the 
weapons they had received. Szymon Ananicz, ‘Helpless 
and lonely: Turkey’s attitude towards the war in Syria’, 
OSW Commentary, 12 May 2014, http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-05-12/help-
less-and-lonely-turkeys-attitude-towards-war-syria
in Turkey’s opinion have links with the Kurdis-
tan Workers’ Party (PKK), is viewed by Turkey 
as the greatest threat to its internal security11. 
It has made its policy towards Syria dependent 
on halting this process, along with removing 
Assad from power. These two goals are thus 
the reason for Turkey’s ambivalent stance on 
Islamic State. However, Turkey actively supports 
the Syrian opposition. 
Those receiving Ankara’s ‘official’ support in 
the conflict are the fighters centred around the 
Free Syrian Army12. The army includes, for ex-
ample, brigades formed by the Turkish-speak-
ing minority, known as Syrian Turkmens13. How-
ever, radical groupings, such as Jabhat al-Nusra 
(the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda) and the Islam-
ic Front centred on Ahrar ash-Sham, are also 
among the major forces engaged in the fight 
against Assad. These two forces are no less rad-
ical than Islamic State, but for political reasons 
they are sometimes classified as ‘moderate ji-
hadists’. Ankara views the rise of these forces 
as a consequence of Assad’s policy, but is itself 
most likely to have made efforts to gain influ-
ence among them in order to safely channel 
their activity. Supporting radical groups form-
ing the Syrian opposition since the very begin-
ning has been risky and has posed the risk that 
Turkey could lose its international standing, 
since these groupings – even if they are hostile 
to Islamic State – propagate similar slogans and 
11 As regards the Kurdish autonomy in Syria, the Turkish 
president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has long threatened 
with an armed response to actions aimed at strength-
ening the PYD forces. See Bedeli ne olursa olsun, engel 
olacağız, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bedeli-ne-olur-
sa-olsun-engel-olacagiz-29394009
12 The Free Syrian Army is the armed wing of the Syrian 
National Council operating in Turkey. The Muslim Broth-
erhood, in which Turkey invested politically as the po-
tential architect of a future post-war Syria, began to 
gain extensive influence in this organisation in the initial 
phase of the conflict. Jonathan Schanzer, Merve Tahi-
roglu, Bordering on Terrorism: Turkey’s Syria Policy and 
the Rise of the Islamic State, Foundation for the Defense 
of Democracies, November 2014, http://www.defend-
democracy.org/content/uploads/publications/border-
ing-on-terrorism.pdf
13 Their participation in the war is constantly emphasised 
by the Turkish government. 
Turkey views the political emancipation of 
Syrian Kurds, who in its opinion have links 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as the 
greatest threat to its internal security. 
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employ similar methods of struggle, and have 
struck tactical deals with IS. 
All participants of the war in Syria (except Is-
lamic State) have received either unofficial or 
official support from external actors. The Free 
Syrian Army is backed by Turkey, the USA, 
by European and Arab countries, and Israel. 
The main protectors of Assad’s regime are Rus-
sia and Iran. Furthermore, the regime’s forces 
are supported by Hezbollah from Lebanon and 
by some Palestinian organisations. In turn, the 
radical Jabhat al-Nusra, a grouping which com-
bats Iran’s Lebanese clients, is supported, for 
example, by Israel14. Given this context, Turkey’s 
engagement in Syria is not an exception. 
The dynamics of the conflict are another factor 
which makes it difficult to evaluate Ankara’s in-
tentions. A specific black market has formed in 
the areas affected by the military operation and 
all participants of the war are involved in the 
functioning of this black market. The warring 
sides use middlemen to trade in ammunition 
and fuel15, and this strengthens the position of 
Islamic State, which is fought constantly only 
by Kurds. The Syrian conflict has also made 
the neighbouring countries engaged – nobody 
monitors the Syrian border: neither the regime 
and the forces operating in specific areas, nor 
its neighbours. This leads to an uncontrolled 
flow of people (militants and refugees), and 
also of ammunition, weapons, raw materials, 
etc. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude wheth-
er the Turkish engagement in Syria (including 
the alleged co-operation with Islamic State) 
is exceptional – systemic and coordinated – 
when compared to the participation of other 
external actors.
14 For example, by offering medical care to wounded fight-
ers, giving them shelter, etc. See Joel Khoury, Are Israel, 
Jabhat al-Nusra coordinating on attacks in Syria?, http://
www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/syria-op-
position-daraa-israel-communication-nusra.html
15 See Erika Solomon, Ahmed Mhidi, The munitions trail, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/baad34e4-973c-11e5-
9228-87e603d47bdc.html#axzz3xgjuXxSC
The ambiguity of Turkey’s policy 
towards Islamic State
The fact that Turkey does not view combating 
Islamic State as a priority is linked to its gener-
al vision of its policy towards the region. Both 
the Arab Spring and the war in Syria which 
was a consequence of it have motivated Anka-
ra to make an attempt to expand its influence. 
However, this would be achieved by installing 
a Sunni government in Syria that would be fa-
vourably disposed towards Turkey. In the longer 
term, this would lead to the creation of a bloc 
of Sunni states for which the Turkish Muslim 
democracy would be an model to emulate16. 
Such a bloc would counterbalance the influ-
ence of Shia Iran in the region, which is, along 
with Russia, Assad’s largest protector. 
From Turkey’s point of view, the situation in 
Syria is complicated due to the political emanci-
pation of Syrian Kurds who are centred around 
the Democratic Union Party (PYD) which in 
2014 proclaimed autonomy in the ‘cantons’ 
it controls: Jazira, Kobani and Afrin (Rojava)17. 
The PYD controls the areas adjacent to the Turk-
ish border, has taken a neutral stance on the re-
gime in Damascus and, being a force which suc-
cessfully combats Islamic State, is backed by the 
United States. At the same time, it is viewed by 
16 Even though the situation has developed disadvanta-
geously for Ankara, this vision is still being pushed for 
by pro-government circles in Turkey. See Etyen Mahçup-
yan, What is Turkey’s role in the new Middle East game?, 
http://www.dailysabah.com/columns/etyen-mahcup-
yan/2015/12/15/what-is-turkeys-role-in-the-new-mid-
dle-east-game
17 Evangelos Aretaios, The Rojava Revolution, https://
www.opendemocracy.net /arab-awakening/evange-
los-aretaios/rojava-revolution
Were a situation to arise wherein the war 
develops contrary to Turkey’s desires, Is-
lamic State would be treated as a real force 
affecting the way the conflict is developing. 
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the Turkish government as a very serious threat 
to its internal security. Around 15 million Kurds 
live in Turkey. For this reason, the emergence of 
any Kurdish political organisation on its south-
ern frontier is treated as a future threat to the 
country’s territorial integrity18. 
Were a situation to arise wherein the war de-
velops contrary to Turkey’s desires, Islamic State 
would be treated as a real force affecting the 
way the conflict is developing. Ankara’s toler-
ation of it is risky but it paves the way for the 
implementation of Turkey’s vision of a Syria 
without Assad. Once he is overthrown, Islamic 
State would also be defeated, and then Ankara 
could continue reinforcing its influence among 
Sunni Arabs, who at present live under this or-
ganisation’s rule19.
The passive stance taken by Turkey’s president, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during the siege of the 
Kurdish city of Kobani in autumn 2014 may be 
used as an illustration of this policy. The city 
was besieged by jihadists, and the (Turkish) 
government would probably have been ready 
to accept its conquest, if only to put off the 
strengthening of the Kurdish autonomous re-
gion on the other side of Turkey’s southern 
border20. The main reason why Islamic State is 
politically useful for Turkey in this context is the 
hostile attitude which Turkey has to any Kurdish 
force which Ankara has no control over.
18 Martin van Bruinessen, a researcher dealing with the 
Kurdish issue, has stated that Rojava is a kind of ‘labora-
tory’ for PKK. See Martin van Bruinessen: Turkish state 
will eventually come to the table with PKK, http://www.
agos.com.tr/en/article/13341/martin-van-bruinessen-
turkish-state-will-eventually-come-to-table-with-pkk
19 This has also been manifested by Turkey’s recent moves 
in northern Iraq where, for example, troops of Sunni Ar-
abs are being trained who are expected to win back Mo-
sul, which is now under Islamic State’s control. Krzysztof 
Strachota, ‘Iraq – a new front for Turkey?’, OSW Analy-
ses, 9 December 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/analyses/2015-12-09/iraq-a-new-front-turkey
20 Erdogan gave in only under pressure from the West and 
after protests from Turkish Kurds, allowing the Peshmer-
ga troops from Iraqi Kurdistan to move through Turkish 
territory and for support to be offered in winning back 
the city. Soon thereafter, in January 2015, a camp for 
35,000 refugees was opened in nearby Suruc on the 
Turkish side of the border. Jenna Krajeski, The conse-
quences of the battle for Kobani, http://www.newyork-
er.com/news/news-desk/the-consequences-of-the-bat-
tle-for-kobani
Another issue illustrating the Turkish govern-
ment’s ambivalent stance on Islamic State is its 
attitude to this organisation’s business activity. 
Already before the Russian Su-24 aircraft was 
shot down by Turkey, the Russian president, 
Vladimir Putin, suggested that Turkey and the 
jihadists were engaged in large-scale economic 
co-operation. 
Islamic State, which controls oil fields and refin-
eries in Iraq and Syria, has created a black mar-
ket for fuel operating in war conditions. As with 
the trade in ammunition, all the participants 
of the Syrian war and neighbouring countries 
are involved in its mechanisms. A network of 
agents operates in Syria. They supply fuel and 
electricity produced by jihadists both to Assad’s 
regime21 and the Free Syrian Army, as well as all 
other parties to the conflict22. Businessmen and 
engineers from Syria and Russia are engaged in 
the trade and production of fuel23. Turkey takes 
part in this because the para-state has used 
and developed the smuggling ‘infrastructure’ 
that has been in place for many years and the 
activity of traders selling cheap fuel in Turkey24 
(fuel is delivered in a similar manner to other 
countries, including Jordan). Turkish border ser-
21 Erika Solomon, Ahmed Mhidi, Isis Inc: Syria’s ‘ma-
fia-style’ gas deals with jihadis,
 https://next.ft.com/content/92f4e036-6b69-11e5-aca9-
d87542bf8673
22 Erika Solomon, Guy Chazan, Sam Jones, Isis Inc: how oil 
fuels the jihadi terrorists,
 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b8234932-719b-11e5-
ad6d-f4ed76f0900a.html#axzz3uUlFStiP
23 Ceren Kenar, Ragip Soylu, Why Are Russian Engineers 
Working at Islamic State-Controlled Gas Plant in Syria?, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/09/why-are-russian-
engineers-working-at-an-islamic-state-controlled-gas-
plant-in-syria/
24 David Butter, Does Turkey really get its oil from Is-
lamic State?, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-eu-
rope-34973181
A specific black market has been formed in 
the areas affected by the military operation; 
and all participants of the war are involved 
in the functioning of this black market.
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vices have taken action to crack down on smug-
gling, for example, by liquidating the illegal fuel 
supply channels25. It is difficult to estimate the 
scale of the smuggling, but its volume is signifi-
cantly higher than that of previous illegal trade, 
and most likely it would not have been possi-
ble without Turkish state officials knowing26. 
It is also suspected that oil was bought from 
the radicals by the government of the Kurdis-
tan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, and ‘le-
galised’ this way and then supplied to Turkey27. 
The scale on which this has been done and the 
indecision in counteracting Islamic State’s busi-
ness activity are proof of Turkey’s ambivalence 
towards this organisation. However, Turkey’s 
participation is not the deciding factor in this 
case. This organisation has created an econom-
ic circulation which it controls, and this makes 
it financially self-sufficient. 
The external and internal consequences
Turkey’s highly ambiguous policy towards Islam-
ic State has consequences for both Ankara’s in-
ternational position and the domestic situation. 
As regards the external dimension, the prestige 
of the Turkish state is gradually eroding. Tur-
key has unconvincingly refuted accusations of 
co-operation with jihadists, and the stance it 
presented at the time of the joint air force oper-
25 Erika Solomon, Robin Kwong, Steven Bernard, Inside Isis 
Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil,
 http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/
26 Who is buying ISIL’s oil?,
 http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidesto-
ry/2015/11/buying-isil-oil-151127173736852.html
27 Mehveş Evin, Boşuna tartışıyoruz,
 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bosuna-tartisiyoruz/gun-
dem/ydetay/2097292/default.htm
ations with the USA is a good illustration of this 
ambivalence (even though the US air force was 
given access to the Incirlik airbase, the Turkish 
air force attacked mainly Kurds).
For this reason the narrative created by Russia 
and Iran (Turkey’s largest rivals in the region) 
and by the Kurds meets with understanding 
in the West. Especially since the Paris attacks 
in November 2015 the West has taken steps 
to co-operate more closely with Russia. At the 
same time, the USA has appealed to Turkey to 
strengthen its southern border and offers it as-
sistance in this area. In effect, this leads to lim-
iting Turkey’s influence on the way the situation 
will develop in Syria. 
Turkey is also making efforts to create its own 
political support base among the Sunni popu-
lation of Iraq and Syria. These calculations are 
probably the reason behind its ambivalent atti-
tude towards Islamic State so far – the territo-
ries it controls are inhabited by a Sunni popula-
tion. For similar reasons Turkey is training Sunni 
Arabs, who are expected to win back Mosul 
– according to this tactic, radicals can only be 
defeated by forces representing local residents. 
Even though concrete actions have been taken, 
creating a political base like this is still a project 
for the distant future. 
In the domestic context, the Turkish govern-
ment’s ambivalence towards Islamic State is 
causing destabilisation in the country. Intensive 
fights with PKK mean that the conflict between 
the Kurds and jihadists is being transferred to 
Turkish territory, proof of which include the at-
tacks in Suruc and Ankara – both of these were 
aimed at supporters of the Kurdish movement. 
This growing threat may potentially lead to 
more attacks against other targets, such as the 
liberal secular opposition, religious minorities 
(mainly Alevis) or Western tourists (like the Is-
tanbul attack). 
The resulting growing social polarisation, which 
is already strong, is causing Islamic State to gain 
a wide scope of ideological expansion in Turkey. 
For the first time in the country’s contempo-
rary history, the government will most like-
ly have to seriously consider the fact that 
radical ideas are gaining public support.
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For the first time in the country’s contemporary 
history, the government will most likely have 
to seriously consider the fact that radical ide-
as are gaining public support. According to a 
public opinion poll conducted by the US Pew 
Research Center in November 2015, 8% of Turks 
have a ‘favourable’ attitude towards Islamic 
State, and 19% have not made up their minds 
about it28. The information that even 6 to 7 
million Turkish citizens could support jihadists 
caused dismay among a significant section 
of Turkish public opinion. 
The Turkish state is also losing confidence 
among a great part of its own citizens who 
expect that it is rather the security apparatus 
which will be the force capable of counteract-
ing the increasing threat from Islamic radicals. 
Conclusion
Turkey’s attitude to Islamic State over the past 
two and a half years has been determined by the 
changing situation in Syria and the strengthen-
ing position of Kurds there. Given the complex-
ity and the dynamics of the conflict, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that Ankara’s support for this 
28 Pew araştırması: Türkiye’de her 100 kişiden sekizi IŞİD’e 
sempatiyle bakıyor, http://www.diken.com.tr/pew-ara-
stirmasi-turkiyede-iside-sempatiyle-bakanlarin-orani-
-yuzde-sekiz/
organisation is in the form of co-operation of 
a strategic and coordinated nature. Turkey does 
not control Islamic State’s operation in its own 
territory. Support for jihadists is temporary and 
indirect – it comes down to intentional negli-
gence, such as turning a blind eye to the rad-
icals’ presence in Turkish territory, the failure 
to monitor the borders, etc. This is expected to 
weaken Turkey’s enemies who fight in Syria.
This kind of policy entails a very high risk. On 
the one hand, Islamic State is hostile towards 
Assad’s regime; it also fights against the Kurd-
ish autonomous region in Syria, which is treat-
ed as a base for PKK’s operation in Turkish terri-
tory. At the same time, it poses a serious threat 
to Turkey’s internal security, which means not 
only transferring the conflict with the Kurds to 
Turkish territory but also involves attacks on 
Western tourists in Istanbul. This in turn ad-
versely affects Turkey’s image as a reliable part-
ner for its Western allies, as a secure state and 
as the EU’s key partner in resolving the migra-
tion crisis, and also as an efficiently operating 
Muslim democracy governed by the rule of law 
(this latter is an image the modern Turkish elite 
has been working on over the past few years).
